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NOTES AND COMMENTS

giving the petitioner an inadequate legal remedy.24 By this decision,
the operation of Indiana's immunity is not precluded by the mere
joining of nominal defendants and Indiana courts must pass initially
on Indiana's liability for tax refunds.25

INSURANCE
DEATH BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS
Beneficiaries sued on the double indemnity clause of a policy
insuring their mother. The clause covered a death occurring "as a
result directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries,
effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means." Decedent fell while entering a bathroom, suffered a broken hip, hydrostatic
pneumonia developed, and death resulted. Prior to her fall, the insured had been bedfast because of chronic nephritis, hypertension, and
coronary sclerosis. Decedent's physician testified that death could have
been independent of her physical illness and except for a broken hip
and resulting pneumonia, she might have lived for several years.
Judgments of the trial and appellate courts1 for plaintiffs reversed
and remanded because beneficiaries failed to prove that death occurred
as a result of bodily injuries effected solely through accidental means.
Ind. PrudentialInsurance Co. of Ainerica v. Van Wey et al., 59 N.E. (2d) 421 (1945).
Indiana is in accord with the majority rule that burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show not only that injury or death was caused
that it was not caused by pre-existing
by accidental means, but also
2
disease or bodily infirmity.
The introduction of the phrase "accidental means" in the double
24.

25.

1.

2.

Indiana legislators appear to have realized the possibility of
intervention by the federal court and therefore established no
basis for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the federal
court when they enacted Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) 64-2614. As suggested by Warren, "Federal and State
Court Interference" 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 377, it lies with each
state itself to eliminate this source of friction with the federal
authority. Justice Frankfurter, "The Federal Court" (1929) 58
New Republic 273, 275, is in accord. Statutory construction of
the statute in question finds that Indiana has followed this wellguided approach to the problem.
Of course, final recourse to federal courts is not foreclosed. "
the construction given the Indiana statute leaves open the road to
review in this court on constitutional grounds after the issues
have been passed upon by state courts." Principal case at 353.
Ind. App.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Van Wey et al., -,
56 N.E. (2) 509 (1944). Lower courts found pneumonia
resulting from the fall was the proximate cause of death. Dissent
in principal case concurs in that proximate cause of death determines liability. The cause was transferred from the Appellate
Court under Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §4-215.
Orey v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 215 Ind.
305, 307, 19 N.E. (2d) 547, 548 (1939); Police & Fireman's Ins.
Asso. v. Blunk, 107 Ind. App. 279, 285, 20 N.E. (2d) 660, 663
(1939); Note (1943) 144 A.L.R. 1416.
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indemnity clause of a life insurance policy has been employed to limit
the liability of the insurance companies. 3 In construing the term "accidental means," it must be realized that an insurance policy is in fact
a contract between insurer and insured. 4 As such, the expressed intent
of the parties must be regarded, 5 subject to the well-recognized rule of
construction that an insurance policy is to be interpreted most strictly
against the insurer.6 A distinction has been drawn between "accidental
death" and "death by accidental means." The majority of the courts
maintain that where the act resulting in death or injury is such that
nothing foreseen and unintended occurs in the doing of such act and
the sole unforeseen element is the effect or consequence of the act, that7
is, the death or injury-such death or injury is "accidental";
where something unforeseen and unintended occurs in the very performance of the act itself, then the resulting death or injury is caused
by accidental means.8 A cursory examination of the cases shows that
there is much confusion in the application of this doctrine even by
the courts which purport to adhere strictly to the distinction. 9
Another serious problem arises when an accident befalls an insured who has a pre-existing condition of disease or bodily weakness,
when neither the condition nor the accident alone would have caused
the death. A slight majority hold no recovery.10 Some states allow
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 871.
Burnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 66 Ind. App 280, 284, 290, 114
N.E. 232, 234 (1917).
F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 252
N.Y. 75, 84, 168 N.E. 834, 837 (1929).
Comm'l Union Assur. Co., Ltd. v. Joss, 36 F. (2d) 9, 10 (C.C.A.
5th 1929); Fidelity Health & Acc. Co. v. Holbrook, 96 Ind. App.
457, 462, 169 N.E. 57, 59 (1929).
Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al, 291 U.S.
491, 496 (1934) (death by sunstroke while playing golf) (strong
dissent by Justice Cardoza who advocated "average man" conception of "accidental means"); Husbands v. Indiana Travelers'
Acc. Assn., 194 Ind. 586, 589, 593, 133 N.E. 130, 131, 132 (1921)
(rupture of blood vessel caused by shaking furnace in usual
manner); Schmid, Guardian v. Indiana Travelers Accid. Assoc.,
42 Ind. App. 483, 495, 85 N.E. 1032, 1036, 1038 (1908) (death
from heart paralysis, caused by carrying bag up a long flight of
stairs).
U.S. Mutual Acc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121, 9 Sup. Ct.
755, 762 (1889) (stricture of duodenum due to involuntary turn
of body in jumping, causing insured to land on heels instead of
toes); Orey v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 215 Ind.
305, 308, 310, 19 N.E. (2d) 547, 548 (1939) (death from scrotal
strangulated hernia developed while cranking car).
See cases cited supra notes 7 and 8. Note (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 762 (advocates true solution lies in placing emphasis upon
whether there is an unknown and unforeseen element which is
sufficiently connected with the voluntary act of insured to constitute a part of it and therefore render the act the accidental
means of the injury or death).
Ryan v. Continental Casualty Co., 47 F. (2d) 472, 473 (C.C.A.
5th 1931); National Masonic Accident Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 F.
774, 776 (C.C.A. 8th 1896); Stanton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 83
Conn. 708, 78 Atl. 317, 318 (1910).
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full recovery on the theory that if the accident accelerates death, which
otherwise might have been delayed for a considerable time, then it
must be held to be the sole and exclusive cause of the death despite
the concurrence of the disease in causing the fatality."1 A sizable
number of states, Indiana included, permit recovery so long as the
accident was the proximate cause of the death and the disease
was no more than the remote cause.1 2 However, a rule has been
developed which seems to effect a compromise betwen the too strict
majority doctrine and the proximate cause theory which is difficult
to apply, with the result that the intent of the parties is frequently
ignored. Courts following this ameliorating rule allow recovery where
the pre-existing condition was simply a normal incident of advancing
age or when the insured has pre-existing tendency to disease, but
deny recovery if disease was abnormal or malignant in its nature.18
Thus, cognizance is taken of the intent of the contracting parties and
yet deserving beneficiaries are not denied recovery. Although Indiana
is generally a disciple of the proximate cause doctrine,'4 it followed
the theory of distinguishing between minor frailties or the normal
infirmities of age and significant diseases in two well-reasoned appellate court cases.' 5
Rationally the principal case on the theory that the nature and
extent of the pre-existing diseases were of the character to prevent
recovery by a reasonable construction of the terms of the policy, the
decision can be sustained.

LABOR LAW
ORGANIZER'S RIGHT TO SPEAK
Appellant, a labor union president, in violation of a restraining
order issued by a Texas District Court pursuant to a Texas statute
requiring labor union organizers to file a written request for an
organizer's card before soliciting members for the union, addressed an
audience of oil workers. The meeting was part of a campaign to
organize the employees of an oil plant under the Oil Workers Indus11.

Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees v. Armbruster, 217 Ala. 282,
116 So. 164, 166 (1928); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hoehn, 215
Ala. 109, 110 So. 7, 9 (1926); Note (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 803.
12. Continental Casualty Co. v. Lloyd, 165 Ind. 52, 59, 60, 73 N.E.
824, 826 (1905); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Wilkins, 96 Ind. App.
231, 249, 250, 182 N.E. 252, 258 (1932); Kokomo Life and Accident Co. v. Walford, 90 Ind. App. 395, 400, 167 N.E. 156, 157,
158 (1929); Note (1930) 5 Ind. Law J. 298.
13. Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233
Mass 558, 564, 124 N.E. 517, 520 (1919); Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 84, 85, 171 N.E. 914, 915
(1930).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Policeman & Fireman's Ins. Assoc. v. Blunk, 107 Ind. App. 279,
287, 288, 20 N.E. (2d) 660 (1939); Railway Mail Assn. v. Schrader, 107 Ind. App. 235, 242, 19 N.E. (2d) 887, 889, 890 (1939).
1. Tex. Stat. (Vernon Supp. 1943) Art. 5154, Sec. 5.

